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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE  
NASHVILLE DIVISION 
 
WAYNE BLATT, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
CAPITAL ONE AUTO FINANCE, INC., 
 
 Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
Case No. 2:15-cv-00015 
 
Judge Sharp 
 
   
MEMORANDUM 
Pending before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment.  Defendant Capital 
One Auto Finance, Inc. (“COAF”) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Wayne 
Blatt’s (“Blatt”) claims under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act.  (Docket No. 30).  Plaintiff 
Wayne Blatt (“Blatt”) filed a Response in Opposition and Cross-Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment.  (Docket No. 38).  COAF then filed a Reply.  (Docket No. 39).  For the reasons stated 
below, the Court will grant COAF’s Motion for Summary Judgment and will deny Blatt’s Partial 
for Summary Judgment.  
BACKGROUND 
 On or about March 18, 2014, Blatt purchased a vehicle from Ford Lincoln of Cookeville.  
(Docket No. 32 at 1).  Blatt financed this vehicle through the execution of a Retail Installment 
Sale Contract (“RISC”).  The RISC was then assigned to COAF.  Id.  After Blatt failed to make 
his first payment on time, he called COAF on May 6, 2014.  During that May 6, 2014 phone call, 
Blatt (1) authorized COAF to make a one-time withdrawal from his checking account to cover 
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his missed payment; and (2) requested that he be enrolled in DirectPay—COAF’s monthly 
automatic payment system.  Id.  To complete Blatt’s second request, he was transferred to the 
Interactive Voice Response (IVR) system, where Blatt input his loan account number as well as 
the last four digits of his Social Security Number.  Id. at 2.  After Blatt did this, the following 
messaged played:  
Please listen to the entire DirectPay Authorization message before giving your 
enrollment authorization.  If you hang up, DirectPay will not be authorized for 
your account.  For your loan number <LoanAcctID>, you authorize Capital One 
to electronically debit a payment of <Amt> from your <(checking/savings)> 
account with routing number <AbaNum> and account number <BankAcctID>.  
Payments will be monthly on the <date> of each month.  The first payment will 
debit on or after <Date>.  Your payments will continue until the total amount due 
is paid or you ask us to stop or change your enrollment.  If you wish to change or 
cancel DirectPay, call us at 800-946-0332.  Once you are enrolled in DirectPay, 
we will no longer send you a monthly statement.  If we do not receive the 
payment for any reason, including insufficient funds, you are responsible for 
sending a payment and we may charge a returned payment fee.  If you are 
delinquent, or become delinquent, DirectPay may not bring your account current, 
and collection calls, late fees and credit bureau impact may result.   
 
To authorize the enrollment of your account in DirectPay, press 1.  To hear this 
information again, press 2.  If you wish to make changes or speak with a customer 
service agent, press 0.  To cancel, press *. 
 
Id.   
After hearing this message, Blatt pressed “1” on his phone.  On May 7, 2014, COAF 
mailed Blatt a letter confirming the one-time debit from his checking account to make his missed 
payment.  On May 8, 2014, COAF mailed Blatt a letter confirming his enrollment in DirectPay.  
Id.  The May 8, 2014 letter contained the following information: the amount of the payments to 
COAF, the recurring schedule of the payments, the date on which the first withdrawal would 
take place, the date on which Blatt agreed to the terms via the IVR system, and information on 
how to cancel or change his DirectPay enrollment.  (Docket No. 32, Ex. C).   
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Blatt now claims that COAF violated the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA), 15 
U.S.C. § 1693 et seq, in the course of enrolling Blatt in DirectPay.  The EFTA governs proper 
authorization of electronic fund transfers.  15 U.S.C. § 1693.  Blatt claims that COAF violated 
the EFTA in two specific ways: (1) COAF did not obtain his authorization to the recurring 
payments in writing, as the EFTA requires; and (2) the May 8, 2014 letter COAF mailed to Blatt 
was insufficient to meet the EFTA’s requirement that COAF mail a copy of the authorization to 
him.  (Docket No. 1 at 7-8).   
LEGAL STANDARD 
Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact [such 
that] the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  But 
“summary judgment will not lie if the . . . evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the non-moving party.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party.  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 587 (1986).  The movant therefore has the burden of establishing that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Barnhart 
v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., 12 F.3d 1382, 1388–89 (6th Cir.1993).  But the non-moving 
party “may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(e)(2).  See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 
1994).  The non-moving party must present “significant probative evidence” to show that there is 
more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”  Moore v. Philip Morris Co., 8 
F.3d 335, 339–40 (6th Cir.1993). 
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The standard of review for cross-motions of summary judgment does not differ from the 
standard applied when a motion is filed by only one party to the litigation. Taft Broad. Co. v. 
U.S., 929 F.2d 240, 248 (6th Cir.1991). 
The fact that both parties have moved for summary judgment does not mean that 
the court must grant judgment as a matter of law for one side or the other; 
summary judgment in favor of either party is not proper if disputes remain as to 
material facts . . . [.] Rather, the court must evaluate each party's motion on its 
own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against 
the party whose motion is under consideration. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
The Court first notes that the parties have stipulated to all the relevant facts.  
Consequently, the only issues that remain are issues of statutory interpretation, and “statutory 
interpretation is a question of law[.]”  Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 772 F.3d 1056, 1059 (6th 
Cir. 2014).  “[T]he starting point for interpretation is the language of the statute itself.”  Id.   
Preauthorized electronic fund transfers, such as the ones Blatt agreed to by enrolling in 
DirectPay, are governed by the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA), 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq.  
(Docket No. 1 at 7).  For purposes of this case, the relevant portion of the EFTA is the following 
sentence: “A preauthorized electronic fund transfer from a consumer’s account may be 
authorized by the consumer only in writing, and a copy of such authorization shall be provided to 
the consumer when made.”  15 U.S.C § 1693e(a).   
The EFTA is implemented by Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. 1005 et seq, which also contains 
official interpretations.  Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. Pt. 1005, Supp. I ¶ 5 (2016). Regulation E 
allows for the consumer’s written authorization to be provided electronically, as long as the 
electronic authorization complies with the Electronic Signatures in Global and National 
Commerce Act (“E-SIGN Act”).  Id.  The E-SIGN Act was enacted in 2000, in recognition of the 
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developing world of electronics, and it mandates that a signature “may not be denied legal effect 
. . . solely because it is in electronic form[.]”  15 U.S.C. § 7001(a)(1).  Furthermore, it mandates 
that a “contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect . . . solely because an 
electronic signature or electronic record was used in its formation.”  15 U.S.C. § 7001(a)(2).  The 
parties have already stipulated that Blatt’s May 6, 2014 phone call was conducted by “electronic 
means” through an “electronic agent” (the IVR system) and that the call generated an “electronic 
record” and “electronic signature” as all terms are defined in the E-SIGN Act.  (Docket No. 32 at 
2).   
Nevertheless, Blatt claims that COAF violated two portions of the EFTA: (1) the 
requirement that his authorization be in writing; and (2) the requirement that COAF provide him 
with a copy of the authorization “when made.”  (Docket No. 1 at 7-8).   
I. Blatt’s Claim Regarding Written Authorization  
First, Blatt claims that his authorization over the phone does not equate to written 
authorization as contemplated in the EFTA.  (Docket No. 38 at 4).  Blatt acknowledges that the 
EFTA and the E-SIGN Act in conjunction allow written signatures to be obtained electronically.  
(Docket No. 38 at 5).  Blatt has also stipulated to facts establishing that his May 6, 2014 phone 
call created an “electronic signature” under the E-SIGN Act.  (Docket No. 32 at 2).  Furthermore, 
a 2015 Compliance Bulletin issued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), the 
government agency in charge of implementing the EFTA, states that the EFTA “does not 
prohibit companies from obtaining signed, written authorizations from consumers over the phone 
if the E-Sign Act requirements for electronic records and signatures are met.”  Requirements for 
Consumer Authorizations for Preauthorized Electronic Fund Transfers, CFPB Compliance 
Bulletin 2015-06, 11232015, 2015 WL 10372389.  Corresponding to this agency interpretation 
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of the EFTA, the legislative history of the E-SIGN Act shows that it was enacted with phone 
systems in mind: “Today, a system that creates a digital file by means of the use of voice, as 
opposed to a keyboard, mouse or similar device, is capable of creating an electronic record, 
despite the fact that it began its existence as an oral communication.”  Regulation E Electronic 
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act-Conference Report-Resumed, 146 Cong. Rec. 
S. 5281, 5284.  Nonetheless, Blatt argues that COAF failed to comply with a different portion of 
the E-SIGN Act, § 7001(c), concerning consumer disclosures.  Blatt believes that because COAF 
did not comply with the entire E-SIGN Act, then his electronic signature is invalid for purposes 
of the EFTA. (Docket No. 38 at 4-5).   
Under a plain reading of § 7001(c), the E-SIGN Act section in question, COAF is not 
required to make the consumer disclosures as Blatt argues.  Section 7001(c) states that “if a 
statute . . . requires that information relating to a transaction. . . be provided or made available to 
a consumer in writing, the use of an electronic record to provide or make available . . . such 
information satisfies the requirement that such information be in writing”  if COAF provides the 
consumer with certain disclosures.  15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1).  This section does not apply to 
Blatt’s situation, however, because COAF did not provide any information in electronic form.  
COAF obtained Blatt’s signature electronically and then provided a copy of that authorization to 
Blatt in paper form.  If COAF had chosen to provide Blatt with a copy of his authorization in the 
form of an electronic record, it may have been required to comply with this section’s consumer 
disclosure requirements, but that is not the situation in front of the Court.  
Blatt attempts to explain around this reading with a number of conclusory statements.  
For example, Blatt claims that “§ 7001(c) is the only subsection [of the E-SIGN Act] logically 
associated with § 1693e(a) of the EFTA, because it deals with the provision of information to 
Case 2:15-cv-00015   Document 58   Filed 02/17/17   Page 6 of 11 PageID #: 239
7 
 
consumers.”  (Docket No. 38 at 6).  Blatt’s assertion that § 7001(c) is the only subsection of the 
E-SIGN Act to apply to Blatt’s EFTA claim is unsurprising, seeing as he has already stipulated 
to facts definitively establishing that his May 6, 2014 phone call created an “electronic 
signature” and “electronic record” in compliance with the E-SIGN Act.  (Docket No. 32 at 2).   
Because § 7001(c) of the E-SIGN Act does not apply to Blatt’s situation, and the parties 
have stipulated to facts establishing that Blatt’s May 6, 2014 phone call created an electronic 
signature in accordance with the applicable portions of the E-SIGN Act, the Court finds that 
COAF met the written authorization requirement as contemplated in the EFTA.  
II. Blatt’s Claim Regarding the Copy of His Authorization 
Blatt’s second claim argues that COAF violated the § 1693e(a) requirement that “a copy 
of such authorization shall be provided to the consumer when made.”  (Docket No. 38 at 1).  
Blatt argues that COAF violated this provision in two ways: (1) COAF did not send the copy of 
the authorization “when made” but instead waited two business days; and (2) the copy that 
COAF did eventually send was insufficient, in both form and substance, for purposes of the 
EFTA.  Id. at 7-9.  
A. “When made” 
 Blatt argues that “when made” means contemporaneously with the authorization. 
(Docket No. 38 at 6-7).  To support this claim, Blatt cites two cases.  Neither of them is 
convincing.  First, Blatt cites a Sixth Circuit case, Wike v. Vertrue, Inc., 566 F.3d 590, 594 (6th 
Cir. 2009), which states that “if and when the payee secures the consumer’s consent in writing it 
must furnish a copy of that writing to the consumer.”  Wike, 566 F.3d at 594.  However, the 
phrase “if and when” does no more to suggest “contemporaneously” than the EFTA itself does 
when it uses the words “when made.”  Next, Blatt cites the District of Connecticut’s statement in 
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L.S. v. Webloyalty, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d 164, 182 (D. Conn. 2015), aff'd in part, vacated in part 
sub nom. L.S. v. Webloyalty.com, Inc., No. 15-3751, 2016 WL 7402617 (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2016) 
that the “discernible individual consumer right protected by § 1693e(a) is a consumer’s right to 
receive a contemporaneous copy of the terms and conditions of a preauthorized electronic fund 
transfer he has authorized from his account.”  However, as the citation indicates, this case was 
later vacated in part by the Second Circuit.  Specifically, the Second Circuit vacated the portion 
on which Blatt relies.  L.S. v. Webloyalty.com, Inc., No. 15-3751, 2016 WL 7402617, at *5 (2d 
Cir. Dec. 20, 2016) (“[W]e vacate as to the grant of the motion to dismiss on appellant’s second 
claim that Webloyalty violated EFTA by failing to provide him with a copy of his funds transfer 
authorization.”).  Consequently, any influence this opinion may have had is no longer relevant. 
Two business days is an appropriate amount of time to provide a copy of the 
authorization when looking at both the plain language of the EFTA as well as other notice 
requirements in the statute.  Examples include: (1) for transfers to a consumer’s account, the 
financial institution must provide “oral or written notice of the transfer within two business days 
after the transfer occurs;” 12 C.F.R. § 1005.10; (2) when a consumer notifies a financial 
institution about an alleged error and the financial institution investigates and determines that no 
error occurred, the financial institution “shall deliver or mail to the consumer an explanation of 
its findings within 3 business days after the conclusion of its investigation;” 15 U.S.C. § 1693f; 
(3) when a consumer learns of a lost or stolen card, the consumer must inform the financial 
institution within two business days in order to limit the consumer’s financial responsibility for 
unauthorized charges; 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a); and (4) the issuer of a prepaid account must provide 
“the consumer a copy of the consumer’s prepaid account agreement no later than five business 
days after the issuer receives the consumer’s request.”  12 C.F.R § 1005.19.  Furthermore, to 
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impose a requirement upon companies the size of COAF that all copies of authorizations must be 
provided at the very moment in which they are made would be unreasonable and unworkable.  
To be clear, the Court is not establishing a specific deadline by which a company must have the 
copy of an authorization mailed.  The Court is merely saying that two business days is an 
appropriate amount of time to meet the EFTA notice requirement in § 1693e(a).  Giving the 
words of the EFTA their ordinary and plain meaning while also considering other portions of the 
statute, the Court finds that contemporaneousness is not required, and two business days after the 
authorization reasonably meets the requirement of “when made.”   
B. Insufficiency of the Copy of the Authorization  
Blatt next argues that the paper copy of the authorization that COAF eventually mailed to 
him did not meet the requirements of the EFTA in two ways.  (Docket No. 38 at 8).  First, Blatt 
claims that because COAF obtained Blatt’s authorization via the electronic IVR system, COAF 
was then required to give Blatt an audio recording of the phone call he placed with the IVR 
system.  Id. at 8-9.  Blatt claims this is required by § 7001(e) of the E-SIGN Act, which states 
that “the legal effect . . . of an electronic record . . . may be denied if such electronic record is not 
in a form that is capable of being retained and accurately reproduced for later reference[.]”  15 
U.S.C. § 7001(e); (Docket No. 38 at 8-9).   
Second, Blatt claims that the paper copy of his authorization that he was eventually 
mailed fails to make up for COAF’s failure to send him a copy of the phone call because the 
letter did not contain the full terms to which Blatt agreed when he used the IVR system.  More 
specifically, Blatt cites the following differences between the IVR system and the paper copy he 
received in the mail: (1) the IVR system informed Blatt that he would no longer be receiving 
monthly statements while the letter did not mention this fact; and (2) the IVR system told Blatt 
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that if he “wish[ed] to change or cancel DirectPay, call [COAF] at 800-946-0332” while the 
letter told Blatt that he “can stop payment of any entry by notifying [COAF] three (3) business 
days or more before [his] account is charged.” (Docket No. 38 at 9).   
The Court finds that § 7001(e) of the E-SIGN Act does not apply to Blatt’s situation 
because Blatt is not disputing the contents of the original phone call in which Blatt gave his 
authorization; Blatt has stipulated to exactly what the IVR message said, that he agreed to the 
terms in the message, and that he pressed “1” to confirm his enrollment in the DirectPay 
program. To any extent that it does, the stipulated facts contain an accurate reproduction of the 
IVR transaction to which all parties have agreed.  Furthermore, the EFTA’s official 
interpretations allow financial institutions to comply with the copy requirement by providing the 
copy of the authorization “either electronically or in paper form” and do not require that it be 
provided in the same form in which the authorization was obtained.  12 C.F.R. § Pt. 1005, Supp. 
I. 10(b) ¶ 5.  Therefore, COAF’s letter mailed to Blatt was a correct form in which to give a copy 
of the electronic authorization.   
Finally, the Court finds that the terms contained in the letter mailed to Blatt are sufficient 
to meet the standards of 15 U.S.C. § 1639e(a), and the letter’s failure to recite the exact words 
used in the IVR system is immaterial.  The CFPB Compliance Bulletin published in November 
2015 states that “[t]wo of the most significant terms of an authorization are the timing and 
amount of the recurring transfers from the consumer’s account.”  CFPB Compliance Bulletin 
2015-06, 2015 WL 10372389.  The CFPB notes that it previously found companies in violation 
of this requirement when the companies mailed copies of authorizations that failed to “disclose 
important authorization terms such as the recurring nature of the preauthorized EFTs, or the 
amount and timing of all the payments to which the consumer agreed.”  Id.   The copy of the 
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authorization that COAF mailed to Blatt contained the amount of the payments to COAF, the 
recurring schedule of the payments, the date on which the first withdrawal would take place, the 
date on which Blatt agreed to the terms via the IVR system, and information on how to cancel or 
change his DirectPay enrollment.  (Docket No. 32, Ex. C).  Blatt fails to cite any case law, 
statute, or regulation requiring the terms in the copy of the authorization be an exact replica of 
the IVR system’s message, and the Court is unwilling to impose such an obligation.  Here, the 
letter mailed to Blatt contained the material and important terms of his DirectPay enrollment.  
This letter is sufficient to meet COAF’s duty under 15 U.S.C. § 1693e(a) that COAF mail Blatt a 
copy of his authorization.    
CONCLUSION 
As stated at the outset, there are no material factual issues remaining in this case.  
Construing the EFTA as well as the E-SIGN Act in reasonable and ordinary terms, the Court 
finds that COAF has not violated 15 U.S.C. § 1693e(a) in relation to Blatt.  For the foregoing 
reasons, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and deny Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment.  A separate order shall be entered.  
           
 
     ____________________________________ 
     KEVIN H. SHARP 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE  
NASHVILLE DIVISION 
 
WAYNE BLATT, on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
CAPITAL ONE AUTO FINANCE, INC., 
 
 Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
Case No. 2:15-cv-00015 
 
Judge Sharp 
 
   
ORDER 
Pending before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment.  Defendant Capital 
One Auto Finance filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Wayne Blatt’s claims for 
violation of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693e.  (Docket No. 30.)  Plaintiff 
Blatt filed a Response in Opposition of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.  (Docket No. 38.)  Defendant filed a Reply.  (Docket No. 
39.)   
For the reasons explained in the accompanying Memorandum, the Court GRANTS 
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment.   
Entry of this Order shall constitute the judgment in this action.  
It is SO ORDERED. 
   
     ____________________________________ 
     KEVIN H. SHARP 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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